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For space, too, is a temporal concept. 
— Paul Klee1 
INTRODUCTION
What remains debated in the extensive literature on Terrence Malick’s films is the 
metaphysics informing Malick’s complex treatment of nature-culture relations in his films. 
Kit and Holly’s vain escape through the badlands in Montana (Badlands 1973), biblical 
plagues in Days of Heaven (1978), different philosophical views on law and violence in The 
Thin Red Line (1998), cosmic and human temporalities in The Tree of Life (2011), and 
consuming moral dilemmas of love (or lack thereof) in the deeply alienated twenty-first 
century settings of To The Wonder (2014) and Knight of Cups (2015). As Iain Macdonald’s 
work on Malick’s The New World suggests, although many critics acknowledge nature as 
one of Malick’s fundamental motifs and themes, very few have “directly purported the 
metaphysics and ‘the problem of nature’”2  in Malick’s oeuvre. Operating within this 
critical and philosophical gap of the problem of nature, this article frames the analysis of 
Terrence Malick’s The New World within a posthumanist discourse on aesthetic 
experiences. William Brown states that “[p]osthumanist discourse seeks to displace old, 
anthropocentric theories and practices with new, posthuman considerations of mankind 
and its creative endeavours, be they technological or artistic.”  3  In this framework, this 
article maintains that Walter Benjamin’s philosophy of time and art is particularly 
productive for an illumination of Terrence Malick’s treatment of nature in his cinema. 
Contrary to modernist and nostalgic conceptions of film technologies as the primary 
cause of humans’ alienation and loss of archaic unity and harmony with the world and 
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nature, second technology, for Benjamin, 4  is a possibility of a positive relation to techne 
and renewed relation to nature in the present world.
Thus, the paper specifically investigates Malick’s use of cinema to deal with issues of 
nature-culture relations in The New World (2005). In narrowing the scope of the 
investigation to nature-culture relations, both Robert Sinnerbrink’s and Iain Macdonald’s 
readings will be foregrounded for their respective, although divergent, philosophical 
positions on Malick’s film. Sinnerbrink argues that The New World “recalls the kind of 
‘aesthetic mythology’ called for by the early German romantics in response to the crisis of 
reason and meaning afflicting the modern world,” and concludes that the legend of 
Pocahontas and John Smith “provides the opportunity to develop the allegorical 
significance of the theme of marriage and the possibility of reconciliation between 
cultures or, more deeply, between human culture and nature.”5 For Sinnerbrink, Malick’s 
retelling of the tainted legend is, in fact, a deliberate “attempt to immerse us in the 
imagined experience of this mythic moment of contact between old and new worlds and 
to transfigure this tainted myth of intercultural encounter through the aesthetic power of 
cinematic poetry.”6 On the other hand, Macdonald argues that, “The New World asks the 
viewer to look upon what occurs in the narrative, on the level of appearances […] as 
nature itself or, better, as nature expressing itself as reason in history.”7 Moving on from 
these two divergent premises, this paper asks: is this “reconciliation” and 
“transfiguration”8  between humans and nature really possible through an aesthetic 
approach to film? Does cinema interfere with–or alter–romantic and nihilistic visions of 
nature and life? 
Drawing on D. N. Rodowick’s account of the figural in film-philosophy9  and Peter 
Fenves work on Benjamin’s concept of plastic time,10 this paper contends that cinema 
does, indeed, play a crucial role in the redefinition of nature-culture interplays beyond 
romantic and nihilistic approaches to nature. It argues that cinema enables a non-
anthropocentric and non-subjective vision of the plasticity of time thereby disclosing a 
redefinition of the modernist space-time paradigm in contemporary culture. In order to 
concretely exemplify the novelties of Benjamin’s figural and temporal approach to 
nature-culture relations in films, the analysis pauses at Malick’s use of a sixteenth-
century map in the initial and final title sequences of The New World. Malick’s cinematic 
map evokes, subverts and reshapes the Kantian nature/culture divide ingrained in 
modernist/postmodernist visions of the map-territory relationship. Through a detailed 
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application of Benjamin’s temporal reduction in film-philosophy –– with its explicit 
relation (and distance) to Husserl’s phenomenology –– this article concludes that 
Benjamin’s shape of time illuminates Malick’s The New World  as a cinematic possibility 
of new, non-anthropocentric approaches to nature-culture relations in the present world. 
TIME AND THE FIGURAL
In the introduction to the edited work After Images of Gilles Deleuze’s Film-Philosophy, 
Rodowick clarifies the relevance and link between his work on the figural and a 
Deleuzian philosophy of time:
In Reading the Figural, I suggest that the movement-image and the time-image are not 
historical concepts and that it is misleading to conceive of the latter as following the 
former along a chronological time line. The two concepts do suggest, however, 
divergent philosophies of history owing to their different relations to the Whole and to 
their immanent logics of image and sign … The movement-image has a history in a 
dialectically unfolding teleology. It progresses to a point where it logically completes 
its semiotic options … But the time-image pursues another logic altogether. Expressed 
as eternal return, the recurrent possibility in each moment of time for the emergence of 
the new and unforseen.11
Contrary to most film-historical readings of the time-image and the movement-image, 
Rodowick reads Deleuze’s cinema images philosophically. On the one hand, the 
movement-image of classical cinema, for Rodowick, entails a Hegelian conception of time 
and history. On the other hand, the time-image of post-war cinema is inscribed within a 
Nietzschean genealogical perspective where linearity and teleology leave the scene in 
favour of a new, non-linear and recurrent logic of time. Following Rodowick, the 
perceptual realism of the film-image (its indexical or virtual relation to space that 
distinguishes analogue and digital technologies, for example) is irrelevant: “the 
experience of film returns to us the forms and shapes of time as change in its singularity, 
contingency and open-endedness [emphasis added].”12 Thus, the Deleuzian shift from the 
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study of images of movement in space to the study of images of time in films inaugurates a 
new set of ethical and aesthetic considerations on films. 
In philosophical terms, for Rodowick, the Deleuzian shift translates from a Hegelian 
conception of historicity to a Nietzschean concept, “[the movement-image and the time-
image] do suggest, … divergent philosophies of history owing to their different relations 
to the Whole [namely, Hegelian and Nietzschean relations to the whole].13  While 
Deleuze’s and, indeed, Rodowick’s work remain essential, for this reader, to an 
understanding of the importance of time in film-philosophy, this article proposes Walter 
Benjamin’s notion of time 14 as a suitable concept in tackling the “the problem of nature” 
and history in Malick’s The New World. Before turning to Fenves’ shape of time and its 
relevance to a figural reading of images of time in films, the next two sections of this article 
point to Malick’s dramatic presentation of an exemplary philosophical gap between 
Hegelian and Nietzschean conceptions of history expressed in, and through, The New 
World’s formal and narrative elements.  
IDEOLOGIES AND THE NEW WORLD
In The New World, the tension between nature and culture that consistently runs throughout 
Malick’s oeuvre, is more evident and played upon. The contraposition between a new and 
an old world, between the colonizers of the western world and the “naturals” – as they are 
called in the movie – of the beautiful, untouched and pristine Virginia of the 1600s is the 
driving conflict of the story, and a purely aesthetic and perceptual one. As Sinnerbrink 
notes, Malick’s The New World challenges the imposition of philosophy and philosophical 
ideas over its distinctively cinematic worlds and poetics.15  Similarly, Martin Donougho 
argues that Malick’s turn from teaching philosophy in American academia to enrolling in 
the American Film School in the late 1960s can be interpreted as Malick’s way of exploring 
cinema’s philosophical possibilities, “… a way of allowing things to emerge into 
significance – to let their showing up itself be shown up … while retaining a certain 
obliqueness of presentation and interpretation.”16  Indeed, as both Donougho and 
Sinnerbrink point out, the cinematic presentation of ideas overcomes the problem of 
ideologies and ideological thinking, or the problem of imposing ideas over the world. In 
this reading, Captain Smith’s story allegorises a precise utopian and ideological vision of 
CINEMA 7 · BLASI! 14
the human-nature relation; a vision that remains irremediably blocked in dualism between 
a dream world of love and the world of necessity and nature. 
The love-story between John Smith and Pocahontas is punctuated by a dream versus 
reality antithesis, conflict and opposition. The film opens with Smith (Colin Farrell) as 
prisoner in Captain Newport’s (Christopher Plummer) ship (“you come to these shores in 
chains”), and Smith’s dualism in the film does not resolve in a dialectical and liberating 
synthesis of sorts; rather, his character’s trajectory arguably shows the limits of a practical 
approach to idealism and dialectical thinking. When Smith falls in love with Pocahontas 
in the Powhatan village immersed in lush forest, he rather idealistically says, “They are 
gentle, loving, faithful, lacking in all guile and trickery. The words denoting lying, deceit, 
greed, envy, slander, and forgiveness have never been heard. They have no jealousy, no 
sense of possession. Real – what I thought a dream.” When Smith returns to the fort, 
Malick’s direction emphasises the visual contrast between the Powhatans’ and the British 
culture, and early James Town is shown as a filthy, horrible expression of a parasitic 
civilization. In the fort, Smith’s voiceover narrates, “It was a dream, now I am awake.” 
The last element of Smith’s dialectical journey occurs at the very end of the film, when he 
meets with Pocahontas, now Rebecca Rolfe, in the perfectly domesticated and assimilated 
nature of European gardens. Here, Smith says, “I thought it was a dream what we knew 
in the forest. It’s the only truth.” Smith’s voice-overs arguably point to the limits of 
dialectical thinking: the dangers of thinking of life as a progression towards a better or 
perfect world, following (or looking for) foundational ideas and original “truths” in 
utopian futures and dreams of new lands. 
Indeed, Smith’s voyage of discovery ends on the metaphoric rocks that Malick’s film 
openly shows when it will come to an end; not finding the “passage to the Indies,” as 
hoped, but just a stream of running water flowing into the ocean. In this view, it is 
important to note that during Smith’s first assigned mission to find the Powhatan king (a 
breathtakingly beautiful sequence shot on the Chickahominy River in Virginia), viewers 
hear Smith in voice-over saying:
We shall make a new start, a fresh beginning. Here the blessings of the earth are 
bestowed upon all. None need grow poor. Here there is good ground for all, and no 
cause but one’s labour in the true commonwealth – hard work and self-reliance and 
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virtue … We shall have no landlords to extort the fruit of our labour, or wrack us with 
their high rents. Men shall not make each other spoil. 
Despite the remarkable historical detail in the mise-en-scene (and implication of 
substantial work carried out in the film’s pre-production phases: scouting locations; the 
resurrection of an extinct Powhatan language in the scriptwriting and acting; and 
historical research informing detailed make-up and costume design), Smith’s 
“progressive” vision in the voice-over narration produces a gap and interruption of 
narrative teleology that strikes the viewer not only for its anachronism, but also for its 
distance from the historical events that arguably followed Smith’s mission in real history. 
In light of five hundred years of American history, coupled with contemporary awareness 
of the disasters of colonization and the systematic destruction of Indigenous cultures in 
the name of cultural superiority, Smith’s words present as particularly disturbing and, 
indeed, naïve.17  Arguably, it is in this discomfort that Malick exposes the dangers of 
imposing abstract ideas over the world and history, and the all-too-human tendency to 
give new names to old practices of war and conquest. 
A NEW WORLD, BEYOND NIHILISM?
As Donougho remarks, in Malick’s film there is a constant preoccupation with naming. 
The New World  displays a “consuming interest in language, in the naming of world and 
thing.”18 For example, the scene where Pocahontas learns from Smith the English name 
of things, as if Smith “was speaking for the first time” as he will confess at the end; or 
the scene where the maid (Janine Divitski) teaches Pocahontas how to dress, wear shoes 
and read the written word. Significantly, at their first encounter the maid says: “My 
name’s Mary, and yours I believe, is…” to which the young man introducing them 
hastily replies: “Oh no! She says it’s not her name anymore. She hasn’t got a name,” and 
the maid politely says: “How unfortunate. Well, we shall have to give you one!”  The 
maid is a key figure helping the unnamed Pocahontas on her journey to a new name, 
when she marries John Rolfe (Christian Bale) as the newly christened Rebecca. Their 
courtship begins when Rolfe joins Pocahontas, who is broken and lifeless after Smith’s 
abandonment and decision to follow his dreams and look for “the passage to the 
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Indies.” The courtship is shown in a montage sequence that starts with a handheld 
camera following Pocahontas’ silent walk and her silent and timid gaze at Rolfe, and 
voice-over of the maid saying:  “… a nature like yours can turn trouble into good…” 
The maid’s words then continue over a montage moving in and out of her pedagogic 
speech as she combs Pocahontas’ hair, with images of imposing trees with broken 
branches, and culminating in Rolfe’s visit, and a visibly satisfied Mary. The maid’s 
speech, in its entirety, is as follows:
A nature like yours can turn trouble into good. All the sorrow will give you strength 
and point you on a higher way. Think of a tree how it grows round its wounds. If a 
branch breaks off it don’t stop, but it keeps reaching towards the light. We must meet 
misfortune baldly and not suffer it to frighten us. We must act the play out, then leave 
our troubles down, my lady. 
Here, the maid’s words refer to Pocahontas’ humanity, “a nature like yours,” a nature that 
is common to the “naturals” and to the English speaking colonisers in the film, and whose 
differences are only apparent at the aesthetic level of language, clothing and naming. 
Thus, the parallel between humans and nature would ostensibly give credit to 
Macdonald’s reading of human and non-human nature as an expression of an 
inexhaustible “will to power” in Malick’s New World. The film’s romantic aesthetic 
would remain at the surface of a deeper nihilism. 
In this view, Macdonald’s reading suggests that the need for foundational truths is 
ingrained in human cultural production and arguably not an exclusive prerogative of the 
Western philosophical tradition. Indeed, The New World opens with Pocahontas invoking 
the muse (like Homer and many others in literary history) to tell the story of her land, 
“Come spirit help us sing the story of our land.” This singing/telling is shown as a 
human necessity, as a way of regaining contact with the “spirit,” the origin and mother of 
all things. In this, Pocahontas’ and Smith’s worlds are no different. Pocahontas asks: 
“Mother, where do you live?”; Smith asks: “Who are you, whom I so faintly hear?  Who 
urge me ever on? What voice is this that speaks within me, guides me towards the best?” 
However, in a compelling reading of the images associated with Pocahontas’ last voice-
over in the estate’s gardens (“mother, now I know where you live”), Macdonald 
concludes that the camera answers for viewers.19 He writes:
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As the angle changes from the topiary hedges and trees that dominate the last part of 
the film, stressing the attempted mastery of nature. In an explicit shift of perspective, 
an orderly hedge gives way to its sinuous branches … and one kind of order yields to 
another, deeper order of which it is part.20
For Macdonald, Malick’s film illustrates how humans’ rationalization of nature is an 
expression of the will to power, and, as such, how the rational is part of nature itself. 
Nevertheless, as Sinnerbrink’s reading points out, it is problematic to relegate Malick’s 
cinematic poetics to a nihilistic and totalizing worldview without distorting the overall 
balance of its aesthetic elements and without engaging with the ethical questions they 
pose.21 
So, what other meanings can be derived from Malick’s The New World  other than (or in 
addition to) nihilism and failed romantic ideals of love and new lands?  At the simplest 
level, Malick’s carefully crafted historical detail in the mise-en-scene and contrasts with the 
film’s romantic aesthetics does indeed point to the dichotomy and polarization between 
empiricism and rationality, nature and culture, body and mind (and all other binaries of 
Cartesian derivation) that arguably started to be en vogue in Western thought from the time 
of The New World’s setting onwards. Nevertheless, Malick’s artistic use of a sixteenth-
century style cinematic map that sinuously draws itself in the film’s initial and final title 
sequences, complicates this simplistic Cartesian reading, a complication moving well 
beyond philosophical “interpretations” and readings of The New World’s narrative and 
formal elements. The cinematic map operates as a potent metaphor able to illustrate the 
philosophical novelties of cinema in destabilising obsolete space-time coordinates. In order 
to support this claim, it is important to frame the map-territory relation as a figural motif in 
philosophical and cultural discourses.
THE MAP-TERRITORY RELATION: A “CONTINUUM OF EXPERIENCE” FROM KANT 
TO BAUDRILLARD AND BATESON 
The map-territory metaphor is a recurrent one in cultural discourse, able to illustrate the 
power of representation as well as the irremediable split between sensory perception and 
the world. The modern use of the metaphor can be traced back to Kant’s first critique.22 It 
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is widely noted that Kant’s first critique was a direct response to the philosophical debates 
between the rationalist and the empiricist positions of the seventeenth century.23 Far from 
being obsolete disputes belonging to seventeenth and eighteenth century Europe, debates 
between rational and empirical positions are responsible for polarized epistemologies in 
the natural and cultural sciences in modern culture and still relevant in increasingly 
globalized academic structures. Attempts to overcome the polarisation of natural and 
cultural sciences are certainly relevant today in cultural-ecological discourses. 
Nevertheless, within a twentieth-century context, Gregory Bateson writes: 
We say the map is different from the territory. But what is the territory? […] What is on 
the paper map is a representation of what was in the retinal representation of the man 
who made the map; and as you push the question back, what you find is an infinite 
regress, an infinite series of maps. The territory never gets in at all. […] Always, the 
process of representation will filter it out so that the mental world is only maps of 
maps, ad infinitum.24 
For Bateson, as for Kant, the problem seems to be that the territory is Dinge an Sich or 
unknowable in itself, “The territory never gets in at all.”25 The Kantian epistemological 
condition is bound to know through representations, maps and approximations based on 
how phenomena are perceived, but not at all “true” to how things are “in themselves.”26 
In a twentieth century context, as in Kant, the territory is still nothing but illusion and 
appearance, the human condition is bound to endless simulations of the ungraspable real 
thing, to the point that in Jean Baudrillard’s notable postmodern “desert of the real” the 
map has replaced the territory and “only simulacra exist.”27 
Kantian philosophy inaugurates modernity and sets forth the enormous philosophical 
task of bridging the abyssal distance between Cartesian rationality and empirical 
objectivism.28 Kant’s seventeenth century solution to the problem of perception is in the 
transcendental categories a priori; however, a non-transcendental and material 
overcoming of the rational versus empirical positions to the world is still very much a 
contemporary philosophical preoccupation, especially in Deleuze’s and Benjamin’s 
projects. Deleuze’s answer to the Kantian impasse is the plane of immanence, a 
Spinozian29  univocal substance that overcomes the problem of the phenomenological or 
transcendental subject altogether. Conversely, this article suggests that Benjamin’s shape 
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of time overcomes the subject/object problem by deanthropologizing subjectivity and 
phenomenological experiences. The next section of this paper will explicate this claim and 
will use Fenves’ work on Benjamin’s “shape of time” to suggest that a Benjaminian 
approach to time is precisely able to remain suspended (without synthesizing) over the 
gap left open between the map and the territory in post-Kantian thought. 
TEMPORAL PLASTICITY AND SUBJECTIVITY
Benjamin’s philosophical project develops a non-subjective and equally non-metaphysical 
conception of life and experience. In the early essay “On the Program of the Coming 
Philosophy,” Benjamin lays the foundation of a philosophical project that will resonate 
throughout his non-linear and non-systematic work; that is, the overcoming of the 
Kantian divide between the perception of the empirical world and the apperception of the 
transcendental (or unknowable) world through what he terms a “continuum of 
experience.”30 In this, Fenves’ ground-breaking study on Benjamin’s notion of time points 
to a novel conception of historicity based on the plasticity of time: a “recapitulation” of 
time in singular openness to new experiences of space as a temporal concept. In his study, 
Fenves draws on a number of philosophical influences qua possibilities in Benjamin 
(including Kant, Husserl, Bergson and The Marburg School)31 to argue that Benjamin’s 
shape of time is non-integrable: 
a particular phenomenon will be identified in the course of this study that nevertheless 
guarantees the existence of a fully “reduced” sphere […] And a name will emerge from 
this sphere: time. The term time in this case refers neither to the time of “inner-time 
consciousness” (Husserl) nor to time as “possible horizon for any understanding of 
being” (Heidegger), but rather, to a “plastic” time, which is shaped in such a way that its 
course is wholly without direction, hence without past, present and future, as they are 
generally understood. [Original emphasis]32
For Fenves, the shape of time generates a non-integrable “reduction” in aesthetic 
experiences. In this view, a non-anthropocentric epoché 33  is a possibility enabled by the 
turning and plasticity of time itself:
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if the course of time can be captured by a curve of this kind [sharply turned on itself] 
its concept can be aptly described as “highly enigmatic,” for every time, down to the 
smallest unit, would be similar to every other time and to time as a whole […] History 
interpolated in the form of a “constellation” acquires the monadic character of time by 
virtue of an epoché whose unity is of a higher power than that of an activity of thinking that 
directs itself toward immanent objects of thought [emphasis added].34
Such a conception of time and history, for Fenves, allows a “bracketing” that does not 
reside in bodily or rational subjectivity. To this end, Fenves details the difference between 
Benjamin’s and Husserl’s “reductions” and notes:
what ultimately separates Benjamin’s mode of thought from Husserl’s is this: from its 
title onwards, Ideas [Husserl’s work Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to a 
Phenomenological Philosophy] proceeds as though the philosopher is fully capable of 
“turning off” the attitude that bars access to phenomena [the original split of 
perception generating the subject/object encounter] and can thus enter into the sphere 
of “pure phenomenology” on the strength of will; Benjamin, by contrast, makes no 
such concession to the profession of philosophy.35
For Benjamin, phenomena and experiences cannot be grasped in “pure” bodily or rational 
receptivity. A Benjaminian epoché requires the “arresting” of the perceiving and thinking 
subject, the suspension of intentionality and the recognition of a constellation of meaning: 
“[w]here thinking suddenly halts [einhalt] in a constellation saturated with tensions, it 
imparts to this constellation a shock through which it crystallizes as a monad [or new turn 
of time].”36 Thus, the only “higher power” 37 capable of guaranteeing a fully reduced––
yet, non-integrable––sphere is the turn of time itself rendered visible and re-cognisable in 
aesthetic and phenomenological experiences.
Fenves’ conceptualisation of Benjamin’s reduction is an important contribution to 
phenomenology and is significant in acknowledging the important function of aesthetic 
experiences in contemporary culture. Benjamin’s shape of time is a “sphere of total 
neutrality” an “innate sphere of knowledge”38 which guarantees a non-anthropocentric 
unity of experience in a non-integrable, reduced sphere of “life.” In this view, Fenves’ 
interpretation of Benjamin’s early work on Hölderlin’s poetry,39 suggests that “life” for 
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Benjamin is precisely this sphere of total neutrality, and that the “poet” (artist, engineer or 
filmmaker) “exists on the verge of life by momentarily converging with the limit called 
‘life.’”40 This limit is a turn of time, a temporal sphere of action. Benjamin’s word for this 
material “life-context” produced by temporal convergences is das Gedichtete [the poetized], 
a noun made by a verb, which implies further actions, further “turnings of time” in the act 
of “poetizing” (perceiving, reading, interpreting, using technology or art).41 In this way, 
Benjamin’s philosophy clearly articulates a post-Kantian and non-Hegelian conception of 
“life” in both non-exclusively empirical and non-exclusively rational terms, but in 
pursuing the study of techne, intended as any creative manifestation, phenomenon or 
practice in the world (human technology and science included).42 It is precisely through 
the study (and contemplation) of art and nature that time can be apprehended: aesthetic 
and figural experiences give time its “life” in re-cognisable shapes and forms. 
THE CINEMATIC LIFE OF THE FIGURAL IN THE NEW WORLD
Benjamin’s philosophical project enables a clear non-subjective and non-metaphysical 
continuity of experience of figural gestures. In this view, Malick’s The New World does not 
simply allude to the Pocahontas legend in an inter-textual exercise, but concretely enacts 
the possibility of  “continuity” and recapitulation of the Pocahontas’ story in time 
intended as a new, temporary space. The space of the figural is a temporary ground 
generated by time. Space (the figural map) collapses in an impossible idealisation of an 
always-changing territory (time). Nevertheless, this collapsed space and disjunctive gap 
of perception becomes a possible “life-context,” the temporary ground that enables new 
experiences and significations of figural gestures. Time generates and disrupts space, it 
constantly forces onwards, towards a non-directional pluriverse of potential life-contexts. 
Just as Malick’s appropriation of the map-territory relation used in the initial and final 
title sequence bears with it all approaches to the metaphor, from Kant onwards, as a 
“continuity” and recapitulation of all meanings that have been assigned to it in different 
historical, philosophical and cultural contexts, so does Malick’s use of Pocahontas and 
John Smith as figural gestures. Malick’s retelling simultaneously draws on the Disney’s 
version43 and on all other popular and fantasized versions and (com)modifications of the 
supposed love story between John Smith and Pocahontas that have been used to construct 
personal and national myths and identities. In this way, Malick’s retelling simply offers the 
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possibility of a new shape and turning of time that encompasses, recapitulates and 
transforms all previous experiences at once. But how is Malick’s retelling distinctively 
cinematic? Does Malick’s use of cinema differ from other forms of figural storytelling?
In an application of Benjamin’s insights in the Work of Art essay, Malick’s The New 
World, like the Disney Corporation, uses the affective power of nature as a metonym of a 
lost, mythical unity with the world. In The New World, however, Malick’s vision expresses 
an oblique, neutral and distinctively non-anthropomorphic44 point of view. Despite the 
affective power of Pocahontas’ story, Malick’s camera work in The New World is strangely 
rendered unable to produce defined gazes, affects, or any form of bodily or rational 
subjectification in its viewers.45  Malick’s seeing ostensibly frustrates closures46  and 
arguably releases a new filmic experience by collapsing existent experiences and associated 
ideals in the material reproducibility of the film’s figural gestures. In this way, Malick’s 
The New World does indeed reveal an “equipment free aspect of reality”––time––through 
the utmost “intense interpenetration of reality with equipment;” 47  that is, using the 
cinema, Disney’s Pocahontas and “auratic” encounters with nature. In other words, the 
“seeing” of Malick’s subject-less visions of nature expresses the kinematic character of the 
shape of time “immediately” 48  in a seeing with a material event that arrests and “halts” 
thinking, 49  releasing a new possibility of time, a possible new figure of re-cognition in a 
temporal life-context. 
CONCLUSION
In “Approaching the New World” Adrian Martin states that, “each of Malick’s films, for 
those who love them, is an experience demanding its witnesses and its testament.”50 
Indeed, the myth of Pocahontas and John Smith needs retelling in light of the disasters of 
colonialism and imperialism. These disasters cannot be reconciled or transfigured through 
an aesthetic approach to cinema, but they can be re-cognised as a continuity of experience 
expressing itself in a new possible shape, a new possible now. As argued, Malick’s 
cinematic retelling of the Pocahontas legend in The New World is not a “new map,” so to 
speak, or a new representation of an original “territory,” nor a liberating and triumphant 
“synthesis” of previous experiences in a progression of time. Benjamin’s thinking opens 
up the film’s “silent witnessing and testament” to a concrete, autonomous and non-
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subjective cinematic life able to recapitulate and turn time into new potential life-contexts, 
into new possibilities, shapes and forms.
The potential consequences of Benjamin’s shape of time in figural film-philosophy are 
significant. The figural approach to films can contribute to the articulation of the 
important philosophical role of film technologies in the disruption and transformation of 
fixed significations (including the humanist need of a perpetual foundation of time) in 
Western thought. Acknowledging time as a non-integrable, non-directional and disruptive 
“now” of re-cognisability, enables that interplay51  between nature and culture that 
Benjamin so clearly foreshadowed in an increasingly mediated and alienated world. 
Fenves’ work on Benjamin’s messianic reduction informs the possibility of a non-
anthropocentric vision of film experiences: a virtuality that this article locates in the 
kinematic character of Benjamin’s philosophy, possibly opening up new abilities and 
possibilities of films in shaping new nature-culture relations in the present world.
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